


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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

## MEMORANDUM

### *The Situation in Vietnam*

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Information as of 1600  
7 June 1967

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HIGHLIGHTS

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I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: There now is additional evidence that the Viet Cong have established a new military and administrative region consisting of Binh Long, Phuoc Long and Quang Duc provinces along the Cambodian border north of Saigon (Paras. 1-4). Weekly review of South Vietnam battle statistics. (Para. 5).

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II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:

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Voter turnout in the next to last round of hamlet elections represented 78 percent of those registered to vote (Para. 5). The Provisional National Assembly is becoming increasingly sensitive to press criticism (Paras. 6-8).

III. North Vietnamese Military Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There is nothing of significance to report.

V. Communist Political Developments: The North Vietnamese leadership is taking steps to offset any possible adverse repercussions within the Vietnamese party stemming from the excesses of the Chinese "cultural revolution" (Paras. 1-4).

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ANNEX:

South Vietnam Battle Statistics  
1963 to week of 28 May - 3 June 1967  
-Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents  
-Weapons and Personnel Losses

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Probable New Communist Military Region

1. There now is additional evidence that the Viet Cong have established a new military and administrative region consisting of Binh Long, Phuoc Long and Quang Duc provinces along the Cambodian border north of Saigon. Previously, the Viet Cong evidently had divided the country into Regions 1 through 6, and the new region has been formed by boundary changes.

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suggests that the region was formed in late 1966, primarily to establish a large, secure base area and to safeguard the southern extremity of the infiltration and supply route which extends into South Vietnam's III Corps via the Laotian panhandle and the Cambodia - South Vietnam border area.

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Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

5. The week of 28 May - 3 June compared with the week of 21-27 May:

I. Viet Cong Incidents

	<u>21-27 May</u>	<u>28 May - 3 June</u>
Attacks	45	30
Battalion or larger.....	1	1
Small Unit.....	44	29
Harassment	488	330
Terrorism	42	33
Sabotage	20	10
Propaganda	9	17
Antiaircraft	<u>317</u>	<u>271</u>
 TOTAL INCIDENTS	 921	 691

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II. Casualties

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>21-27 May</u>	<u>28 May-3 June</u>	<u>21-27 May</u>	<u>28 May-3 June</u>
Killed	2,216	2,420	212	235
Wounded	-----	-----	539	787
Missing/ Captured	-----	-----	<u>34</u>	<u>55</u>
TOTALS	2,216	2,420	785	1,077

	<u>US</u>		<u>FREE WORLD</u>	
	<u>21-27 May</u>	<u>28 May-3 June</u>	<u>21-27 May</u>	<u>28 May-3 June</u>
Killed	313	214	29	15
Wounded	2,616	1,160	52	29
Missing/ Captured	-----	-----	==	==
TOTALS	2,929	1,374	81	44

III. Weapons Captured

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>21-27 May</u>	<u>28 May-3 June</u>	<u>21-27 May</u>	<u>28 May-3 June</u>
Individual	461	Not	124	115
Crew-Served	<u>92</u>	Reported	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTALS	553		125	120

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
II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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




Hamlet Elections

5. Voter turnout in the fourth and next to last of the current series of hamlet elections was calculated at about 78 percent of the 474,000 registered voters. This is in the same range as other hamlet elections in the current round. Voting took place in 771 hamlets in 34 provinces for a total of 855 hamlet chiefs and deputy chiefs. Several instances of Viet Cong antielection activity were recorded, but they were widely scattered and did not seriously affect the over-all election effort.

National Assembly Developments



The PNA has become increasingly sensitive to editorial and cartoon attacks which have hit at its mode of operation and at the recently adopted presidential election law. These editorial attacks have consistently echoed the government viewpoint.

7. In late May, the press adopted a very ugly tone, even to the point of suggesting that the country would be better off without the assembly. Few papers have come to the defense of the assembly, editorially. Only one paper has suggested that intense press criticism and attacks on individuals may impair the usefulness of future national assemblies. The only encouraging aspect of this press bombardment of the PNA is that reportorial coverage of assembly sessions has been complete and unbiased.



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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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## V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. The North Vietnamese party leadership is demonstrating some concern over possible adverse effects on the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) as a result of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution in China. The Hanoi leadership is worried because a large number of Vietnamese Communists, including some at high levels, have traditionally looked to Mao Tse-tung for guidance in the theoretical field as well as in certain practical areas. No doubt considerable confusion exists within the North Vietnamese party over events in China.

2. Several recent authoritative pronouncements,--one by party first secretary Le Duan and two articles in Hoc Tap, the party theoretical journal--clearly reflect Hanoi's particular concern over Mao's unorthodox practice of establishing "Red Guards" to attack the regular party apparatus and leadership. One of the articles, by Hong Chuong in the May Hoc Tap, indirectly but unmistakably assailed Mao personally. The same issue of Hoc Tap carried an editorial which argued forcefully that the VWP remains devoted to the orthodox Marxist-Leninist concept that the working class and its party--the Communist Party--must play the leading role in all "revolutionary struggles," whether the main task of the party is to wage a war of liberation or to build Communism in an already "liberated" country. The Soviets have charged that Mao ignores the role of the working class and that he relies instead on the army and peasants. In Vietnam, the editorial declared, "no other class and no other party" can "lead all our people to victory." This constitutes a clear admonition to all VWP members that no "Red Guards" type movement will be tolerated in Vietnam.

3. A speech by Le Duan, given last December but only broadcast by Hanoi on 30 April, hammered home the same theme as Hoc Tap. In his lengthy and rather pedantic fashion, Le Duan explained to a conference of trade union officials the party's position on the leading role of the working class. Le Duan insisted that it is "absolutely indispensable" that the "leadership

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of the working class" be confirmed. He further asserted that the line of the Vietnamese revolution is "the political line of the working class and not of any other class."

4. There is no evidence that any significant element within the VWP is currently enamored with Mao's Cultural Revolution. The tone of these articles suggests that the VWP leadership is attempting to head off problems before they arise. At any rate, it is clear from these pronouncements that the North Vietnamese leadership is not only disturbed over the possible implications for their own party of the excesses in China but that they are now so annoyed by Mao's pretensions to have created a new and universally applicable theory of revolution that they are willing to engage in open criticism of the Chinese.

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

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
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


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## Weapons Losses



## Personnel Losses (Killed only)\*



US Casualties to Date: Killed 10,780 Wounded 65,201 Captured 175 Missing 441

\*Due to a change in the reporting of personnel losses, beginning 12 February 1967, the weekly and monthly figure will represent only personnel killed.



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